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Introduction
Since the inception of the patent system, tax dollars were used to pay inventors to
develop and patent their Federal Funded (FF) inventions.1 Many public benefits are paid for by
taxes such as police, military, infrastructure, schools and much more.2 However, FF inventions
are not necessarily free for the public to use. This has led to a discussion of why the public may
be “paying twice” for FF inventions.
FF inventions contribute large amounts of revenue to the economy. Technology
licensing from FF inventions between 1996 and 2007 contributed as much as $187 billion to the
US gross domestic product and $457 billion to gross industry output.3 FF inventions should be
closely watched, as allowing profits in excess of the incentive required for commercialization of
an invention may produce a loss to society.4
Revenue from patent rights has been an incentive to develop FF inventions in
commercial products. The “Revenue from university-owned patents often goes toward funding
more research, reducing the need for government funding and thereby funding research by taxing
those using the technology, rather than the population in general.”5 Patents on FF inventions are

1

Peter Lee, Patents and the University, 63 DUKE L. J. 1 (2013).
Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government
Spending and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179 (2013).
3
Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, 2(52) SCI TRANSL MED, Oct. 6
2010, at 52cm27.
4
See Sean Flynn ET AL., An Economic Justification For Open Access to Essential Medicine
Patents in Developing Countries, 37 J.L. MED & ETHICS 184, 186 (2009) (“The second loss from
monopoly pricing is “deadweight loss” from forgone transactions, which would have taken place
at the lower competitive price. These lost sales are known as “deadweight” because they do not
create surplus for the buyer or seller… In pharmaceutical markets, the deadweight loss is often
referred to as the problem of “access”: the poor cannot purchase a drug product because of its
high price, and as a result, are untreated”).
5
Gary Pusinelli, Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government Funding Inventions
Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 413 (2006).
2
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used to promote research and to provide an incentive to invest in the technology. This way, each
FF dollar will actually fund more research than its face value.
The Bayh-Dole Act (BDA) increased the ease that an inventor could obtain patent rights
in an FF invention in the hopes of creating more products from the inventions. It created an
emphasis on patenting and licensing FF inventions to industry.6 The BDA has created a structure
for determining the rights of inventors involved in the FF invention and has facilitated the
evolution of FF inventions from conception in universities to application in industry. The exact
impact of the BDA has been disputed whether or not it is benefiting the public.
Universities’ rights in FF inventions were changed when the BDA was passed due to
their large receipt of federal funds.7 Universities, as public created entities, are geared towards
education and promoting the public interest. Following these goals, universities were initially
reluctant to enforce their patents against public use since they have paid for the invention.
However, universities still spend money to develop FF inventions and must recover their costs.
They have been able to recover these costs through patent enforcement. This has led to
“[M]ounting economic pressures cast[ing] doubt on any optimism for a decrease in university
participation as plaintiffs in patent infringement litigation in years to come.”8 Universities are
asking the public to pay for the use of their FF inventions.
Some abuse FF inventions for their own profits, while others try to only recover costs
they have spent in order to turn the invention into a commercial product and promote further

6

DAVID C. MOWERY ET. AL.. IVORY TOWER AND INDUSTRIAL INNOVATION: UNIVERSITYINDUSTRY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER BEFORE AND AFTER THE BAYH-DOLE ACT IN THE UNITED
STATES 7 (2004).
7
Robert E. Litan & Lesa Mitchell, A Faster Path from Lab to Market, HARVARD BUS. REV., Jan.
2010, 52 (2010).
8
Jacob H. Rooksby, Innovation and Litigation: Tensions Between Universities and Patents and
How to Fix Them¸15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 312, 356 (2013).
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research. It is a far-reaching goal to create a perfect system where FF inventions generate the
exact amount of revenue to recover costs involved during development. Most of the time
companies do not develop products to only get their money back. Profits are needed to create an
incentive for further development. The “patent system must be related to the world of commerce
rather than to the realm of philosophy.”9 The goal of the system therefore must be to restrict
excessive profits, not eliminate them entirely.
This article will analyze the BDA’s impact and ways to improve it. The article will start
out by analyzing the background of the patent system and how patents are enforced in Part I. It
will discuss the balance of providing a monopoly in order to promote advances in technology.
Then in Part II the article will analyze the current state of Intellectual Property rights in
universities, how they use those rights to generate revenues and the impact the BDA has on
universities. Further, it will look into how universities may be abusing FF inventions for their
own profits, a goal which was not proposed by the BDA.
Many commentators have solutions to restrict excessive profits from FF inventions;
however they lack practical application and contain philosophical arguments not grounded in
reality. In Part III, the article will discuss the approaches proposed by others for curbing excess
profits. It will discuss the positives and negatives of these approaches. The article will also
propose a few alternative solutions to curb excess profits and improve the effectiveness of the
BDA.

9

Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536 (1996) (citations omitted).
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Part I: The Purpose of Patent
A patent is an “exclusive right to an invention as given not of natural right, but for the
benefit of society.”10 Patents are granted for “the public good [which is] … the motivating
principle behind the award of any patent.”11 The patent statute rewards the “inventor” not the
“pure scientist.”12 A patent is to provide “encouragement to [inventors] to pursue ideas which
may produce utility.”13 Patent law has operated on this premise since 1790.14 Patents are
granted to inventors in order for society to benefit from the invention.
A patent is a right to exclude that is derived from Congress’s constitutional power to
promote the useful arts.15 The United States Constitution says “[t]he Congress shall have Power
to… promote the useful Arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive
right to their respective Writings and Discovers…”16 Congress took this authorization and
granted patentees the right to exclude others.17 This right has manifested itself in the patentee’s
right to sue infringers. The patentee has the right to sue for infringement against anyone who
“makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention within the United Stated or imports

10

Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to Isaac Mcpherson, in WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert Ellery Bergh, Washington Thomas Jefferson
Memorial Association, 20 vols., 1905).
11
Jacob H. Rooksby, Myriad Choices: University Patents Under the Sun, 42(2) J. L. & ED. 313,
313 (2013) (hereinafter Rooksby II).
12
Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 58 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 293, 295
th
(9 Cir. 1943).
13
Jefferson, supra note 10. See also Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407
(Fed. Cir. 1996) (Where they discuss patent rights are granted to the person who the invention
belongs).
14
Brd of Trs of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Systems, 563 U.S. ____
Inc. 131 S.Ct. 2188 (2011) (citations omitted).
15
F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN.
L. REV. 697, 697 (2001).
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17
Pusinelli, supra note 5, at 413.
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into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent.”18 Congress has used
its constitutional power to promote the useful arts by giving patentees an “authorization to sue
for infringement.”19
“[T]he existence of the patent system’s impact is beyond dispute.”20 However, the exact
extent of the impact is debated.21 The impact can be measured from monetary gains generated by
patents, jobs created, or even the progress of science as a whole. Any one of these methods is
difficult to quantify and it may not encompass the entire impact of the system. Intense
investigation is required to determine if the patent system is used to “promote the useful Arts.”22
Determining whether the benefit the patent system has on society is positive or negative is a
difficult task to undertake.
Measuring the effect patents have on technology may be difficult due to the advancement
of the technological field. “Patented inventions face the competitive pressure of time.”23 New
patented products, during infancy of the patent term, have competition from the products they
have replaced.24 New patented products are expensive, due to the monopolistic control given by
a patent right. In contrast, older products are typically cheaper, since they have had the
opportunity to find the best manufacturing processes and will want to stay competitive with the
newer product. Later in the term of a patent, it faces the opposite competition, the newer product,
which it once was.25 The quicker an invention becomes obsolete to newer inventions it may

18

35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2010).
Rooksby, supra note 8, at 358
20
Kieff, supra note 15, at 698.
21
Id. at 698.
22
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
23
Kieff, supra note 15, at 730.
24
Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property Rights?, 8 RES. L. & ECON. 31, 31
(1986).
25
Kieff, supra note 15, at 730.
19
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effectively end the patent term early for that invention, since there is no longer a demand for the
invention. The speed at which a technological field develops can affect the incentive required to
encourage new products.
Each technical field requires a varying amount of research and development (R&D)
costs. The R&D of a new pharmaceutical in the United States averages 10 to 15 years and costs
$800 million dollars.26 In contrast, developing a new coffee mug would require substantially less
R&D. Additionally, the pharmaceutical industry is particularly susceptible to “rip-off”
pharmaceuticals due to the fact that chemicals are easily replicable.27 In order for a company to
want to pursue development of the product there needs to be an incentive, e.g. profits.
The costs from R&D have to be recovered in future sales of the product. University
patenting and licensing has become particularly concentrated in the biotechnology field due to
the high start-up costs.28 Other technological fields may require substantially less money and
time to develop new products than in the biotechnology field. This means the incentive needed
for a company to engage in the development of a new product is substantially less.29 The
variable amount of incentive required for each technological field increases the difficulty in
determining the patent system’s effect.
A. Patent Licensing and Enforcement
The patent system, overall, has undoubtedly affected the economy. The patent system has
had an impact on long-term international competitiveness as it promotes national economic

26

Taiwo A. Oriola, Against the Plague: Exemption of Pharmaceutical Patent Rights as a
Biosecurity Strategy, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 287, 311 (2007).
27
Oriola, supra note 26, at 312.
28 Mowery, supra note 6, at 2.
29 A Samuel Oddi, Plagues, Pandemics, and Patents: Legality and Morality, 53 IDEA 1, 14
(2011).
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growth.30 Patents give the owner the ability to negotiate licenses with those wanting to make,
use, offer to sell, sale or import their inventions. These licenses can be non-exclusive (licensed
to anyone willing to pay) partially exclusive or exclusive (restricted licensing).31
A patent holder uses an exclusive license to restrict those who may license their patent,
usually to provide a benefit to the exclusive licensee. “Exclusive licenses can generate windfall
profits to licensees. . .[,] but at the cost of diminished dissemination and possible reduction in
follow-on R&D that comes when only one company is permitted to exploit a patent.”32
“[R]estrictive licensing policies can limit the diffusion and use of an invention or related
knowledge.”33 However, for the pharmaceutical industry, this may be the only way for the
patentee to recover costs in developing their inventions. If many could obtain a license they
could effectively ride on the first licensee’s coat tails in proving out the methods of development
and FDA trials. No one would want to be the first licensee. Without the exclusive license as an
incentive for development, it is possible that the patented invention may never be developed into
a product.
Universities, as patentees, can agree to license their patents in varying ways. This
decision is usually dependent on the costs the university incurred in development and the
likelihood they will recover their costs in the license. There are usually costs still to be incurred
for further development leading to a product. Another consideration is the ease someone could
duplicate the invention once it is in the public domain.34 However,
[T]he potential to generate revenue through licensing patents can create incentives
for universities to license their patents exclusively, which can lead to what
30

Kieff, supra note 15, at 698.
35 U.S.C. § 208 (1984).
32
Rooksby II, supra note 11, at 318.
33 Mowery, supra note 6, at 2.
34
Rooksby II, supra note 11, at 315-6.
31
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amounts to monopolistic control by companies of new drugs, diagnostic tools, or
other products of great importance to the public’s health and welfare.35
There are no restrictions on the procedures or methods a university may use to extract benefits
from their patent rights. They may end up extracting profits in excess of their costs.
The debate from many commentators has been whether universities should be able to
license FF inventions and use them to generate profits. Determining the correct amount to
recover under a license is difficult for a university to determine when, in the early stages of
development, the commercial worth and costs require in commercializing the invention into a
product are uncertain.36 Many universities may be “[B]etter to license a patent of uncertain
market potential.”37 Licensing is where the universities most appropriately utilize their patent
rights.
Some patents can be considered blocking a field of technology, e.g. a blocking patent.
That is to say the patent prevents further advances in the field unless you are able to license it.
This may create prohibitive costs to research in a particular field. One historic way of clearing
the blocking patents was to create a patent pool. “Patent pools solve specific problems, such as
the clearing of blocking patents or protecting against ‘hold up’ or ‘hold out’ by individual patent
holders.”38 Patent pools may be useful to promote commercialization of FF inventions.
“Patent pools are collective licensing arrangements in which two or more parties grant
licenses to their respective intellectual property to each other or to a third party that sub-licenses
the pooled technology to others.”39 Historical patent pools, however, ultimately required

Id. at 315-6.
Rooksby, supra note 8, at 328.
37
Id. at 328.
38
Scott Sher ET AL., The Role of Antitrust in Evaluating the Competitive Impact of Patent
Pooling Arrangements, 13 SEDONA CONF. J. 111 (2012).
39
Sher, supra note 38.
35
36
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government intervention to get the pool started.40 Further, patent pools are only allowed when
they permit the participants to generate substantial efficiencies they could not otherwise obtain.41
Patent pools are formed out of necessity not as a predetermined means of ensuring innovation.
Patent pools may raise the costs of developing competing technology.42 As a collection of
patents, a patent pool can be a monopoly of the technology in a particular subject field, in other
words, a monopoly of monopolies. Professors Ryan Lampe and Petra Moser performed a study
that found patent pools actually had the effect of discouraging innovation.43 Patent pools usually
require the person wanting to join a patent pool to license all relevant Intellectual Property (IP) to
the patent pool.44 Patent pools can lead to higher start-up costs, uncertainty on returns, and
monopolistic control of invention fields.
B. Patent Enforcement by Non-Practicing Entities
Litigation by a Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) has become a concern over the past
decade.45 NPEs do not create the commercial product themselves.46 They will attempt to license
their patents or use them to sue a potential infringer instead of undertaking the commercialization
themselves.47 Universities, which may operate as NPEs, “are not in the business of
commercializing their patents through direct manufacturing, distribution, and marketing of any

Pusinelli, supra note 5, at 429-30.
Sher, supra note 38.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 114 (citing Ryan Lampe & Petra Moser, Do Patent Pools Encourage Innovation?
Evidence from 20 industries in the 1930s, (Dec. 2, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors).
44
Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities Adding to the Cost?, 43
HOUS. L. REV. 1373, 1414 (2007).
45
Thomas H. Kramer, Proposed Legislative Solutions to the Non-Practicing Entity Patent
Assertion Problem: The Risks for Biotechnology and Pharmaceuticals, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 467,
469 (2014).
46
Kramer, supra note 45, at 467.
47
eBay Inc. v. MerExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
40
41
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ultimate products or services their patents cover.”48 They have to partner (license IP) with
industry to get products to market. Universities must be able to license their IP in order to
recover costs incurred during development of that IP.
The monopolistic prices created from patent rights in FF inventions have been a cause of
public debate. For example, Carnegie Mellon University recently won a settlement of $1.17
billion in a patent infringement suit.49 Further, a university patent handler, Wisconsin Alumni
Research Foundation (WARF), which manages the University of Wisconsin’s patents, has been
particularly controversial. They have received criticism for threatening patent enforcement.50 It
seems unlikely that a billion dollar plus verdict on a FF invention is in the “public interest.”
Assertion of patent rights is a large burden to society. “[T]he direct cost of NPE
assertions is $29 billion annually, and lobbying by affected industries.”51 Patent Assertion
Entities (PAEs) are a particular type of NPE that have an interest in patents only to extract
payment in the form of licenses or royalties from another. Patent trolls are the most heinous
PAEs whose extraction of profits from patents amounts to a level similar to extortion. They are
only interested in extracting revenue from patents with total disregard for the state of technology
or advancement of the field. Patent trolls are like pirates, “an enemy to all mankind.”52
A patentee has a choice of how to enforce their patent rights through money damages or
an injunction. A preference for not making products and instead extracting profits from others is

Rooksby, supra note 8, at 327-8.
Rich Lord, Carnegie Mellon Wins $1.17 Billion in Patent Case, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,
Dec. 27, 2012, at B1.
50
Henry Etzkowitz, Knowledge as Property: The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the
Debate over Academic Patent Policy, 32 MINERVA 383, 386(1994); See also Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. USPTO, 689 F.3d 1303, 103 U.S.P.Q.2d 1681 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
51
Kramer, supra note 45, at 467.
52
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 5 L. Ed. 57 (1820).
48
49
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not against the law as was discussed in eBay v. MerExchange.53 Those who “do not produce any
products . . . may still be eligible to receive injunctions against parties infringing their patents.”54
A patentee’s remedy in an infringement lawsuit is not based on their status as a PAE, NPE or
manufacturer.
An injunction is grounded in equity and in the case of patents is usually an order to stop
producing the infringing product or practicing the infringing method or use.55 Injunctions can be
devastating to an infringer. They could have invested capital in order to practice the invention
and are now forced to stop practicing it. In other words, they are not going to recover the
invested capital. Further, by stopping practice of the invention it becomes less available to the
public.
In Ebay v. MerExchange they discussed the remedy of an injunction as it relates to NPEs.
A NPE may not meet the typical four-part test for an injunction to be applied, since they are not
producing a competitive product.56 There is no equitable ground for the NPE to stand on. Instead,
they may only be able to receive monetary damages but the court does not decide the question.57
Mark Lemley, a law professor at Stanford, has even questioned whether or not universities are
patent trolls when asking for injunctions.58
An injunction, which restricts someone from practicing an invention, goes against the
goals of a university, which are to further the advancement of technology. “In some cases, the
absence of irreparable harm, adequacy of legal remedies, balance of hardships, and public
53

eBay, supra note 47.
Lee, supra note 1, at 59.
55
KIMBERLY MOORE, ET AL. PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY (West Academic Publishing, 4th
ed. 2013).
56
eBay, supra note 47.
57
Id.
58
Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 611 (2008).
54
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interest may counsel against granting an injunction, and ongoing royalties may be sufficient to
compensate the university for the infringement.”59 The remedy of injunctions cannot be
abolished for all NPE held patents, however. If injunctions were abolished for all NPEs, others
wishing to use the patent may never try to negotiate in good faith with the patent holder. They
would instead just practice the invention knowing that the worst outcome is a royalty.
Part II: Universities and Their Interactions with Intellectual Property
It is important to discuss universities and their IP rights when discussing FF inventions.
Universities through their employees create many FF inventions.60 The federal government’s
$150 billion plus R&D budget is primarily funneled through universities.61 Universities see
patents “as a necessary conduit for transferring federally funded technologies to the private
sector for commercialization.”62 Thus, universities are a vital part of how FF inventions become
commercial products.
The purpose of a university is to foster education. “[P]ublic service is at the heart of why
universities emerged in the public sphere.”63 “Universities must also promote the dissemination
of knowledge through publication, education, basic/non-commercial innovation, healthcare, nonscientific scholarship, and more.” Jacques Loed of the Rockefeller Foundation once stated, “[I]f
the institutions for pure science go into the handling of patents I am afraid pure science will be

Lee, supra note 1, at 83.
McElmurry v. Ark. Power & Light Co., 995 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (Wherein the
Court discussed Common law shop rights provide that an employer is allowed to use an
invention patented by one or more of their employees while working for the employer without
liability of infringement); see also Stanford, supra note 14.
61
Robert E. Litan & Lesa Mitchell, A Faster Path from Lab to Market, HARVARD BUS. REV.
Jan.-Feb. 2010; see also Rooksby, supra note 8, at 347 (Where he discusses “respondents at
public universities are more sensitive to a defendant’s political influence than are respondents at
private universities, to a statically significant degree.”).
62
Lee, supra note 1, at 32.
63
Rooksby, supra note 11, at 316.
59
60

Sovesky

12

doomed.”64 Patent policy at universities was originally to “serve the public interest” and to
ensure “the public could obtain [inventions] at reasonable prices.”65 Universities use of patents
should be for the benefit of the public.
A. The Bayh-Dole Act
Scientific advancement is vitally important to society. “Key technological advances - from the mass production of penicillin to the Manhattan Project - - helped win [World War II]
and revealed to policymakers the importance of large-scale science funding.”66 Federal funding,
prior to 1980, was provided to promote scientific advancement by varying agencies within the
federal government. Each agency had its own approach; agencies, such as the National Institute
of Health (NIH), kept title to the FF invention and others let the recipient of federal funding take
title.67 Society has promoted technological advances through federal funding for decades.
Some commentators believe funding of the invention should be the only incentive to
pursue the product not a patent.68 However, only 4% of patents created from FF inventions were
used to create commercial products prior to the enactment of the BDA.69 Many governmental
agencies were reluctant to give a commercial developer an exclusive license to a patent or the

Lee, supra note 1, at 12 (citing Charles Weiner, Universities, Professors, and Patents: A
Continuing Controversy, Tech. Rev., Feb.-Mar. 1986, at 33, 35).
65
Id. at 13; see also Letter from Mark E. Coticchia, Vice President for Research and Technology
Management, Case Western Reserve University to Tobin Smith, Associate Vice President for
Federal Relations, The Association of American Universities (January 7, 2010) (available at
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Bayh_Dole_Act&Template=/CM/ContentDisp
lay.cfm&ContentID=4235) [hereinafter Coticchia] (Where it discusses that state laws require
many not-for-profit organizations, such as universities, assets to be used for proper charitable
purposes only).
66
Lee, supra note 1, at 28
67
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996).
68
Pusinelli, supra note 5, at 411.
69
Id. at 397.
64
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patent right in a FF invention.70 Most of the technology created from these FF inventions still
required large amounts of R&D to create a saleable product.71 Therefore, many private
businesses were reluctant to develop FF inventions any further without patent rights, for fear of
competition stealing their design and by-passing the development costs they had incurred.72
A change was needed in order to promote the utilization of FF inventions. University
collaboration with industry has played a large role in the transformation of FF inventions into
commercial products.73 Universities and industry began to support a legislation change to further
promote commercialization of FF inventions in the hands of the government.74
Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980, to combat the problem of wasted FF
inventions. The BDA was created to “promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally
supported research or development [and] to promote collaboration between commercial concerns
and nonprofit organizations, including universities . . . “75 A further goal was “to promote free
competition and enterprise without unduly encumbering future research and discovery.”76 The
incentive behind the BDA was to get more mileage out of the same amount of federal funding.
The BDA was hailed as “innovation’s golden goose” and was said “spurs job creation”.77
The BDA gave institutions and inventors the ability to “elect to retain title to any subject

70

Id.
Id. at 393.
72
Id. at 393.
73 Mowery, supra note 6, at 3.
74
Peter Lee, supra note 1, at 64.
75
35 U.S.C. §200 (2000).
76
35 U.S.C. §202(c)(4) (2011).
77
Innovation’s golden goose, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2002, 3,
http://www.economist.com/node/1476653?story_id=1476653. & Memorandum from
Association of University Technology Managers, The Bayh-Dole Act: It’s working 1, 1
(available at
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Bayh_Dole_Act&Template=/CM/ContentDisp
lay.cfm&ContentID=11603).
71
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invention.”78 The BDA created a structure for determining ownership in FF inventions.79 It
created limited procedural protections, “which expressly give contractors the right to challenge a
Government-imposed impediment to retaining title to a subject invention, § 202(b)(4).”80
Most FF inventions are performed at institutions such as universities. The institution
developing the technology had priority to the invention if elected, then the government, then the
actual inventor if everyone else declined.81 Additionally, “subject invention” as defined in the
BDA is “any invention of the contractor conceived or first actually reduced to practice in the
performance of work under a [federal] funding agreement.”82 The BDA allows contractors and
inventors to retain title to their FF inventions, but does not require them to do so.
A policy behind the BDA was to give universities an ownership interest, the patent right,
in FF inventions to provide an incentive to commercialize the invention.83 The BDA allowed
universities to interact more freely with industry due to their ability to retain rights in
inventions.84 Industry became more willing to collaborate due to the clear chain of title for
ownership of FF inventions.85 “[U]niversities could facilitate the direct interaction between
inventors and licensees that is often critical to technology transfer.”86 The understanding was

78

35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2011).
Sanjesh Sharma, The Bayh-Dole Act and Allocation of Ownership Rights in Inventions Arising
out of Federally Funded Research, 23 No. 8 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 23, 24.
80
Stanford, supra note 14, at 2191.
81 Id. at 2191.
82
35 U.S.C. § 201(e) (2002).
83
Lita Nelsen, Identifying, Evaluating, and Reporting Innovative Research Development at the
University, In UNDERSTANDING BIOTECHNOLOGY 25, 26-7 (Gale R. Peterson ed., 1993).
84
David Roessner ET AL., The Economic Impact of Licensed Commercialized Inventions
Originating in University Research, 1996-2007, at 7-9 (Sept. 3, 2009) (available at
http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/BIO_final_report_9_3_rev_2_0.pdf).
85
Wendy H. Schacht, Cong. Res. Service, The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected Issues in Patent Policy
and the Commercialization of Technology 13 (Mar. 16, 2012), (available at
http://www.autm.net/Bayh_Dole_Act_Report.htm).
86
Lee, supra note 1, at 65.
79
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universities would be encouraged by the license revenues to invest money and time into the
development of products.87 The BDA provided a defined path to recover costs associated with
bringing the invention from the developmental stage to a commercial product.
The government does not lose out on the FF invention after granting the inventor the
patent rights. The BDA contains a provision that allows the government to retain rights in the FF
invention. The BDA provides that the funding agencies have “a nonexclusive, nontransferable,
irrevocable, paid-up license to practice … the subject invention.”88 This protected society’s
investment in the FF invention by securing a royalty-free license to practice any such FF
invention for governmental purposes, whether they be for military, health or otherwise beneficial
to the public.89 The BDA affects the ability of the public to practice the invention, but not the
ability of the government agency that is directly funding the invention.
The BDA has a provision for “March-In” rights. These rights allow the government, in
certain circumstances, to “March-In” and grant a license to a patent to a third party when a
patentee is refusing to grant a license.90 Additionally, the BDA can restrict the grant of a patent
in FF research from the beginning, but only in “exceptional circumstances.”91 Declarations of
exceptional circumstances, however, have been extremely rare when giving out federal
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funding.92 Additionally, the NIH has never exercised March-In rights.93 In the end, the inventor
has more rights in FF inventions after the BDA than they did prior.
The BDA requires the inventor to pursue commercialization of the FF invention. The
inventor, if they elect to retain title in the FF invention, must take “effective steps to achieve
practical application of the subject invention.”94 The holder of title in the FF invention “must try
to develop the invention by making reasonable efforts, under the circumstances, to attract
licensees and to license the invention to industry.”95 The licenses given out usually require “due
diligence” and “performance milestones” to ensure the FF invention is being developed.96 The
meaning of this provision has yet to be fleshed out by the courts. It could eventually play an
important role in protection against patent trolls.
B. The Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act
Determining the impact of the BDA is an incredibly difficult task. The BDA is using the
patent system as an incentive, whose impact is hard to determine. When determining the impact
of the BDA, you must consider the measure used for nuances and errors it may contain. Further
frustrating the determination is how rapidly technology has advanced since the inception of the
BDA. Trying to measure the impact of the 30+ year old BDA is a difficult task.
The BDA may have affected patents filed for FF inventions. In 1980, the federal
government held approximately 28,000 patents from FF research and fewer than 5% were
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licensed to industry for development into commercial products.97 Universities, a large recipient
of federal funds, only held 264 patents in 1979 and by 1997 universities held 2,436 patents.98
During that same time period, patenting applications in general increased at one fifth of the rate
of university held patents.99 A factor frustrating the determination of the BDA’s impact is
university patents were already significantly on the rise at the time of the enactment.100 The
impact of the BDA on university patenting is unclear.
During the enactment of the BDA there were “several other developments of great
importance for the growth of the U.S. university patenting and licensing.”101 For instance, the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office began granting broader claims to cover new types of
artifacts.102 Additionally, universities had limited technology transfer knowledge at that time.103
Further, their patenting activities were already increasing due to expanded activities in the
biotechnology field.104 University owned patents increased since the inception of the BDA, but
there is a lack of hard evidence linking the two.
Patents generate massive income for universities. The income has led to many institutions
with little knowledge of patents to begin patenting their inventions under the BDA.105 In 2011,
universities held 4,700 issued patents and received over $2.5 billion in patent related income.106
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In the year prior, universities spent $61.2 billion on R&D and the federal government picked up
61% of the tab.107 Universities are receiving large amounts of patent related income, nevertheless
they may be spending more on R&D.
The BDA has fostered many new start-ups companies. Specifically, “spin-off” companies
from universities are being formed.108 The companies can license the technology from a
university and develop commercial products incorporating the technology. However, most of the
interaction between industry and universities “has not involved patenting and licensing.”109 From
1980 to 2008, 6,652 startup companies were formed as a result of university FF research.110 Of
these companies, 72% had their primary place of business in the same state as the university they
were licensing technology from.111 Strong connections between universities and industry have
led to more commercial products.
C. Universities Assimilating Into the Commercial World
Since the implementation of the BDA, more FF inventions at universities have been
patented. The BDA encourages universities to conduct systematic review of laboratory work in
order to assess its value as an IP asset.112 This work in the past may not have been reviewed for
patenting, since patents from FF inventions were not as easy to obtain prior to the BDA.
Universities have become more akin to a commercial entity striving to extract profits from its
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assets.113 Since the change in focus, the “research culture” has changed and universities are
shying away from sharing their results.114
Not every university is looking to extract profits from their patents. In contrast, some
have used their control of patents to infuse the commercial world with some of their goals.
Universities have been using licenses to “‘push’ certain noncommercial, academic norms into the
marketplace.”115 Universities’ licensing provisions “may also reflect the perceived needs of a
university attempting to balance public interest with commercializing the results of its
professors’ research.”116
For example, researchers at the University of Toronto patented a method of making
insulin.117 Eventually, the university widely licensed the patent and then used it as “a tool to
discipline the industrial world, to organize the distribution and use of the new drug, and to
guarantee its accessibility.”118 Some universities want to “ensure product safety, prevent patent
piracy, and disseminate technologies widely to the public.”119 University patents can be used to
serve the public good.
University inventions cannot solely be dedicated to the public. It has been said that doing
so is “the more efficient way to do science – and maybe the more honorable way.”120 Further,
when looking at cases such as Association of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, “It seems
hard to argue that quicker and cheaper access to this information about one’s own genetic
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disposition would not plant itself firmly in the public interest.”121 University research can be
crucial for advancing science and maintaining the United States’ competitive edge.122 As such, it
is important not to remove an incentive for a university to perform research.
It is believed that universities may not be able to risk as much of their assets as a
commercial firm.123 Universities must take their own goals into mind. They have been criticized
for trying to patent foundational research processes.124 This criticism could lead to potential
donors restricting money or changing hiring practices.125 As NPEs, universities should not have
to worry about keeping commercial competition out of the market. They should only be
concerned with recovering their costs and funding further research.
The public holds universities to a higher standard, even though they have become similar
to commercial entities. However, as Professors Henry Etzkowitz and Andrew Webster have said
“[S]cience and property … have been made contingent upon each other through the concept of
‘intellectual property rights.’”126 Commercialization of inventions has become part of a
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university’s goals. Former Duke University President Terry Sanford “Once noted that
‘universities should do all that is reasonably possible to earn returns on inventions, and should
not be timid in making prudent business arrangement to assure the largest fair return.’”127 The
character of a university is changing, and with that change, the laws governing them must
change.
Universities are becoming more and more active in litigation. In the past they have been
“hesitant to take assertive posture in patent enforcement actions.”128 The hesitation occurs when
they balance their IP rights versus their core goals of not alienating donors, not upsetting political
ties to defendants, or undermining their public-service values.129 These goals have not stopped
all litigation, however. Professor Jacob Rooksby has compiled a list of patent suits filed by
universities between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2010.130 He has found that 33
universities had filed 57 separate patent infringement suits.131 Universities are asserting their
patents and enforcing their rights.
D. Technology Transfer Offices
Technology transfer offices (TTOs) have become the IP hubs for most universities.
“[U]niversity … [TTOs] have demonstrated their ability to enter into all varieties of arms-length
agreements without external intervention.”132 TTOs were created to promote university
commercial activities; some argue to derive revenues from those activities.133 They exist in order
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to take the research created within the university and turn it into a useful product with the help of
a private partner.134 Over 3,000 universities have TTOs that generate over $1 billion in
royalties.135 These offices are an example of the university’s split personality. On the one side
you have Dr. Jekyl, who protects the public interest. On the other side is Mr. Hyde, the TTO,
who may act as an in house PAE.
TTOs have an unclear goal. It has been said TTOs exist to “benefit society.”136 However,
“The university technology transfer officials who draft agreements for the transfer of research
materials tend to see their primary job as bringing licensing revenue into the university.”137
TTOs at most universities are not profit centers; in converse, they actually “lose money.”138 The
fact that they lose money gives support to the argument that TTOs are not created to generate
revenue and may benefit society.
TTOs typically operate as “merely a broker” between the inventor and the licensee.139
This is not the case at every university; each office may operate drastically different and have
varying levels of effectiveness in licensing IP.140 TTOs primary power resides in the university
owned IP and they should have similar goals of benefiting society.
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Part III. Attempting to Turn Profits Back Into Products
When striving to create an improved law or rule to fix a problem, the answer should be as
clear as possible. “The lawyer's greatest weapon is clarity, and its whetstone is succinctness.” 141
The approaches proposed to enhance the BDA so far would not increase its clarity nor enhance
its goals. When trying to fix a problem the approach should not cloud the law with uncertainty.
There can be no doubt that the BDA has had an impact on the dissemination of
technology, development of commercial products and the progress of the arts and sciences. Its
enactment has changed the landscape of FF inventions. However, FF inventions are still being
underused and may be blocking future research. Some recent developments and proposals for
changes to the BDA to increase its effectiveness are discussed below.
A. Protecting Patent Rights Obtained During Development
Stanford v. Roche was a monumental decision that has been said to further cloud the
patent ownership waters. Some believe Stanford v. Roche will “hinder the relationships between
universities and private entities.”142 This would be in stark contrast to the goals of the BDA,
which were to create a clear ownership framework. However, this decision, as will be discussed,
is currently in line with the BDA and will promote further collaboration between the universities
and private entities in creating products.
In Stanford v. Roche, a Stanford researcher was working on a FF project at Stanford and a
similar project at Cetus (Eventually bought by Roche). In order to use Cetus’s facilities, the
researcher signed an agreement that any research he did at their facility would belong to Cetus.143
Cetus was responsible for the upkeep of their facility, not Stanford. The researcher performed
141
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work on better HIV tests at the university and eventually at Cetus.144 The researcher wanted to
learn the advanced Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) techniques that Cetus was using.145 He
began to learn the techniques at their facility after executing an assignment giving Cetus rights to
any invention he created while working there.146 Eventually, Stanford filed patents for the HIV
tests, under the BDA.147 Cetus began making the HIV detection kits and Stanford filed suit
against their use believing the university had title to the invention because their employee had
created the invention.148
The court held that Stanford did not have superior title by virtue of the BDA and the
rights conferred by the BDA do not automatically override any prior assignment an inventor may
have made.149 The court determined that the established patent law precedents confirmed the
rights to an invention do belong to the inventor and that the inventor is free to assign those
rights.150 The contract rights were unaffected by the BDA. The researcher was bound to the
agreement he had with Cetus. The court further explained
Since 1790, patent law has operated on the premise that rights in an invention
belong to the inventor. See, e.g., Gayler v. Wilder, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 477, 493,
13 L.Ed. 504. In most cases, a patent may be issued only to an applying inventor,
or—because an inventor's interest in his invention is assignable in law by an
instrument in writing—an inventor's assignee. See United States v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187, 53 S.Ct. 554, 77 L.Ed. 1114. Absent an
agreement to the contrary, an employer does not have rights in an invention
“which is the original conception of the employee alone,” id., at 189, 53 S.Ct.
554; an inventor must expressly grant those rights to his employer, see id., at 187,
53 S.Ct. 554. Pp. 2194 – 2196.151
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This decision emphasizes to industry that they will still have patent rights in inventions when
university employees use their facilities. Further, “It is consistent with existing provisions of the
Patent Act that state the inventions belong to the inventors who conceive and reduce them to
practice.” 152 Each inventor has the ability to assign their patent rights. That assignment,
according to the Court in Stanford v. Roche, will still be valid since the patent rights revolve
around the inventor and not around the inventor’s employer.
The BDA was created to promote collaboration between universities and private industry
to fully commercialize FF inventions into products. If every university had superior rights to FF
inventions, industry would not want to invest in the development of the FF invention for the fear
of losing any rights they may obtain. Industry would be without an incentive and would not be
able to recoup their costs of development if a university had a superior right in a FF invention,
even if there was a contract. The BDA was not created to give superior rights to any particular
inventor; it was created to promote commercialization of FF inventions.
“The [Bayh-Dole] Act's disposition of rights does nothing more than clarify the order of
priority of rights between the Federal Government and a federal contractor in a federally funded
invention that already belongs to the contractor.”153 Stanford v. Roche is in line with the BDA
and has strengthened its goals. If Congress wanted to change established patent law with the
BDA and give universities a higher priority it would have “said so clearly.”154 The only outcome
from this decision will be universities revising their contracts with employees and industry. The
BDA still maintains its framework of ownership after Stanford v. Roche and is enhanced by it.
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B. Restructuring TTOs
Universities receive large amounts of federal funding for R&D. The university’s IP hub,
the TTO, needs to be considered when looking to improve the BDA. Litan and Mitchell have
argued that that to enhance the effectiveness of the BDA a university-inventor should be able to
choose his or her licensing agent.155 The motive behind who controls FF inventions at
universities may affect the BDA’s impact.
It has been argued that TTOs are not as effective as they can be. Even though the NIH
has increased its federal funding, the number of drugs approved by the FDA are on a downward
trend.156 FDA approval levels spiked up to record levels in 1996 and there is some evidence
linking the subsequent drop to inefficient TTOs.157 However, the link is disputed.158
Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office explains the sudden spike of approvals and then
sudden decline as a result of an increase in the FDA’s budget that enabled it to clear its backlog
of drug-approval applications.159 In the end, no matter the cause, new drug approvals have been
trending downward since 1996.
TTOs may be restrictive to FF inventions. “Inventive faculty members are hostage to
their [TTO], regardless of its efficiency or contacts.” TTOs “generate less licensing revenue for
the university than the cost of their operations.”160 Additionally, they are normally short staffed
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and underfunded due to operating at a loss.161 This has led to many professors standing in line,
taking a number and waiting their turn.162 The attention individual inventors are getting is
lacking in universities. Short staffing and lack of intimacy with inventors can cripple a TTO’s
effectiveness.
The relationship between a university’s inventors and their TTO is of upmost importance.
“[T]echnology transfer works best when faculty have a strong, ongoing relationship with their
universities technology transfer office.”163 If an inventor does not get along with or is unengaged
with their TTO, the FF invention can suffer. Inventors who have a FF invention worth
commercializing may “be ignored or discouraged,” while TTOs will concentrate on the
inventions they believe are the most important.164 Thus, society may lose when FF inventions are
put on the shelf by a TTO instead of commercialized.
University-inventors faced with an ineffective TTO are forced to use other means. If they
want their FF invention to become commercialized they will have to use the “back door.”165 In
this instance, the inventor will not tell the university or the government sponsor about their FF
invention and instead will proceed to their own agent, “[W]hich a sizeable minority of the faculty
already do.”166 Back door inventions are still not effective, as an inventor will have to minimize
their communication with potential partners to ensure they do not tip-off a university to their
activities.167 There are currently no good solutions to an ineffective TTO.
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Litan and Mitchell argue the best alternative to inventors being stuck with their TTO is to
give university-inventors a right to pick the licensing agent of their choice, the free market
approach.168 “It bears emphasis that the right to choose an agent is and would remain
independent of the ownership if the IP, which would remain with the university.”169 The
inventors, almost always, understand their inventions the best and understand the path to
commercialize them and/or find the optimal partners to help out with the inventions.170 The
inventor should be able to commercialize inventions sitting idle in TTOs.
The free market approach would not destroy TTOs altogether, but instead it would create
competition. It would allow university-inventors the ability to choose a TTO from another
university or a private agent. “A free market would also most likely lead university [TTOs] to
specialize or turn to outside agents with the appropriate expertise.”171 It may also lead to
universities dropping their TTO altogether if they are not worthwhile to operate. 172 With the free
market approach universities would still receive revenue generated from the IP.173 The university
would be free to determine what is best for them. This would allow efficient TTOs to help
promote inventions from inventors who were being underserved by their own TTO.
Moreover, it is undeniable that universities, as with any other company, compete for the
top employees. It is argued that universities would not want to have inefficient TTOs as it would
168
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be a barrier to achieve the best faculty.174 Opponents of this approach argue universities would
be at a disadvantage if TTOs were inefficient at commercializing inventions since potential
employees would be deterred.175 However, the argument actually points to the free market
approach as beneficial. It is true that a university with an inefficient TTO would deter
prospective employee, but if their employees had the option of using any TTO, then TTOs would
not even be a factor when deciding employment. The faculty member would be able to use any
TTO they prefer.
Another argument by opponents of the free market approach is that many “inventions
have limited, if any, commercial value.”176 Moreover, “The most time-consuming aspect of
commercialization occurs after the license is signed.”177 These inventions require more funding
from the university to get it to a level where commercial investment is appropriate. Nevertheless,
TTOs usually lack the resources to properly negotiate and monitor licenses for further
development of the invention.178 However, inventions that on their face do not appeared to be
commercially viable would not be picked for commercialization by the TTO anyways.179
Regardless of the level of commercial value, TTOs are limiting inventions that may be
developed for society’s use.
Another counter argument to creating a free market for TTOs has been argued by the
Association for University Technology Managers (AUTM) and their members. They have said
“To turn decisions regarding the disposition of University assets over to individual faculty
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members . . . would not only be unenforceable, but also violate state not-for-profit laws.”180
However, this is not the case as the assets would still be controlled by the universities’ contract
with the individual inventor.181 The free market approach does not change who owns the
revenues generated by the IP.
Fundamental research should be about “Publication and dissemination of research
results.”182 Some believe that with unregulated TTOs there will be more of an incentive to
patent fundamental inventions. TTOs are believed to decline to patent “fundamental research
tools,” instead they facilitate their dissemination and many “retain research exemptions when
licensing their technology to others.”183 This argument may have worked, except for the cases
where the University of Utah held the patents for the BRCA1 and BRCA2 gene, then exclusively
licensed it, or where the University of Toledo patented insulin, along with many other cases.184
In the end, TTOs are supposed to promote patents and licenses with commercial partners to
generate revenue, not the commercialization of products.
University-inventors have different goals than TTOs. Professors Rai and Eisenberg have
argued that professors care more about the “true science of dissemination” than a TTO.185 It has
been said that professors used to be skeptic of patents due to “[S]cientific norms prioritizing
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communal sharing over individual property rights.”186 Jonas Salk, who developed the Polio
Vaccine at the University of Pittsburgh, did not patent his invention and instead stated, “Who
owns my polio vaccine? The people! Could you patent the sun?”187 Historically, universityinventors are more concerned with dissemination than patenting.
University-inventors, however, are not immune to self-interest. University-inventors may
move frequently between universities and industry.188 This may lead to them preferring to patent
one invention while not another, or to pursue extra patent protection. These decisions could all
be guided by future employment opportunities. Since the inception of the BDA, professors have
become more receptive to patents and commercializing their inventions.189 Whether a TTO or
professor controls the course of action, there is no safeguard to protect against one’s own selfinterest of survival.
To truly promote commercialization of products there needs to be an intermediate party
(mediator) between the university and society (the checkbook). TTOs, currently, do not fill this
role. University-inventors may be able to if allowed to use the free market approach to TTOs.
They may not share universities interests, but that is superfluous as the core of federal funding is
to give a benefit to society. 190 The interests of the university should be secondary to that of the
commercialization of FF inventions and dissemination of the information learned from the
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federal funding. However, the most suited intermediary would most likely be the government.
Professor Pusinelli, however, notes them as a costly alternative to regulate patents from FF
inventions. A university-inventor would be the most cost effective intermediary between the
university and society.
An approach to enhance commercialization of FF inventions would be to allow
universities to have unrestricted access to each other’s TTOs in a way similar to that proposed by
Litan and Mitchell. The system would look for a middle ground between the current restrictive
TTOs and a complete free market approach, where inventors use the university as the checkbook.
The approach would allow universities better suited to operate a TTO to take on inventions from
other universities.
This approach would give the university-inventors some clout when a TTO is deciding
whether or not to commercialize their FF invention. In this approach, each inventor should first
try their in-house TTO at patenting the FF invention and its eventual commercialization through
licensing. Then, if the FF invention is not taken up by the internal TTO within a certain period of
time, the university-inventor should be allowed to use any TTO they wish. The TTO would not
be the sole source for the inventor. Additionally, the university would be better equipped to
monitor their TTO. The university would be able to see if inventions their TTO passed on
became successful at another TTO. In this approach any TTO that is effective will not lose any
business and it would satisfy all of AUTM’s, Mitchell’s and Litan’s concerns.
This approach would liberalize the unforgiving structure of TTOs. The liberalization of
TTOs would allow exceptional ones to help more FF inventions get into the public space. It
would also force underperforming TTOs to either improve or close, as they would then have
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competition. This would provide an incentive for universities to keep an effective TTO if they
want to keep their FF inventions close.
Further, an incentive for a TTO to take on the responsibility of the FF invention from
another university would need to be created. Some inventions that are patented now may be less
significant and not recover costs.191 The first university where the university-inventor works
should not have to cover the expenses of another university’s TTO. The incentive for the second
TTO should be a cut of the royalties or license. In this approach, no upfront costs would be
assessed on the first university by a university-inventor with an insubstantial FF invention. These
FF inventions would most likely be rejected by all other TTOs as they would be judged on their
commercial potential. The first university would not lose any money as they still own the patent
rights and instead may be able to receive royalties they otherwise would not have been able to
receive.
TTOs may believe they cannot survive in a competitive environment and will no longer
be able to operate. However, “productive policy changes that benefit society as a whole should
not be stillborn because of opposition of small interest groups or self-interested parties.”192 The
BDA was not created to foster TTOs. The BDA was created to turn more FF inventions into
products. If TTOs stand in the way of products they should be changed or abolished.
C. Management of Federally Funded Inventions
The BDA restricts the universities’ ownership of FF inventions. They are not allowed to
transfer the patent rights in a FF invention without the government agency’s approval, unless the
“assignment is made to an organization which has as one of its primary functions is the
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management of inventions.”193 This has led to universities creating other corporations, such as
the University of Wisconsin’s WARF, or transferring the patents to outside licensing
managements companies.194
Universities have found a way to exploit the statement in the BDA that provides for the
transfer of their inventions to companies whose “primary functions is the management of
inventions.”195 Universities are beginning to transfer their IP to the most notorious PAEs, patent
trolls. Additionally, university practices are becoming closer to PAEs in their use of patent
enforcement.196 Many PAEs extract licenses through threats of litigation or litigation itself.197
Universities are transferring their patents to revenue generating machines that are disinterested in
creating products and instead concentrate solely on profits. This is in contradiction to the goals of
the BDA, which are to promote commercial products not profits.
An example of a university licensing its technology to a PAE is illustrated in Eolas
Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.198 In the case the University of California licensed one of
their patents to a PAE. The PAE sued Microsoft and obtained a jury award of $520.6 million and
ultimately the University of California obtained $30.4 million as a settlement.199 The unsettling
part is that almost 50 universities have signed on with the most prominent PAE, Intellectual
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Ventures.200 Even more concerning, when universities assign their patent rights to a PAE the
deals are harder to track and avoid detection as the university no longer owns the patent, the PAE
does.201 In effect, they get to collect the revenue without getting their name involved with the
patent suit. In the end, even if the universities have not assigned their patents to Intellectual
Ventures to extract revenue, they are starting to adopt the same business model.202
Enhancing dissemination cannot mean asserting a patent with no intentions of turning
that patent into a product. The BDA was conceived because many FF inventions were lying
dormant and underused. It was not created to allow PAE to use it as a revenue stream without
promoting inventions. The PAE could have no intentions of furthering the invention at all and
instead only desire profits. The BDA should not give a PAE an exclusive buying power on FF
inventions from universities.
Deciding who has a primary purpose for “management of inventions” is not easy to
discern.203 This language in the BDA has only led to further abuse of FF inventions by PAEs and
other companies to capitalize on the profits that a patent can generate. The BDA should change
the restriction on primary purpose of “management of inventions” to allow industry to be on
equal footing with PAEs. There are two different approaches to fix this construct of who can
own a FF invention.
The first way would be to further restrict the phrase “primary functions is management of
inventions” to include only university owned entities. However, this still may be problematic if
TTOs have exclusive rights to the inventions. They can be inefficient and PAE-like themselves,
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while further restricting the phrase will lead to fewer FF inventions becoming available for
public use.
The second way the phrase could be changed would be to eliminate it entirely. In this
approach, the biggest abusers of the patent system, patent trolls would not have better footing to
acquire the inventions. Any company could also attempt to get the rights in the patent. Further,
companies that produce products would be more apt to further develop the technology. Patent
trolls should not have an advantage over product producing business when acquiring FF
inventions.
To prevent abuse by PAEs, when a patentee is enforcing a patent they should have to
affirmatively prove that they have “within a reasonable time taken effective steps to achieve
practical application of the subject invention in such field of use.”204 In an infringement action,
the burden should be on the patentee not the infringer to prove this. This would require the PAE
to show they started to develop a commercial product or tried to pursue an agreement with a
company prior. They would have to prove they were actively seeking collaborators, partners, or
manufacturers to help bring their invention to market. Then, an entity would have to prove they
were not merely waiting idly by to enforce their rights against others (extortion), who may have
never even heard of their patent. In the end a company that does not research new technology or
develop new products should not be allowed to extract profits from FF inventions without
attempting to commercialize them.
Another problem is there is no automatic right for the government to take title to the FF
invention if the BDA is not complied with.205 To enhance commercialization ,the patent rights

204

35 USC § 203(a)(1) (2011).
Central Admixture Pharmacy Services, Inc. V. Advanced Cardiac Solutions, P.C. 482 F.3d
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
205

Sovesky

37

should automatically revert to the government agency in the case where the patent rights are not
applied to a commercial technology within a certain period of time.206 The period of time could
be extended based on a showing of active development. The companies pursuing patents through
the use of the BDA should already be familiar with its provisions requiring efforts to
commercialize. This additional requirement should not come as a shock and would give the BDA
teeth to lash back at those holding on to the technology solely for profits and not
commercialization.
Professor Jacob Rooksby has mentioned that universities having their name on lawsuits
can affect proper decisions that will promote further commercialization of FF inventions.207
Universities are on a slippery slope when pursuing patents and enforcing those patents,
especially when they try to seek a remedy from an infringer. Their “disinclinations to enforce
their patents through infringement litigation only serve to undermine their research missions in
several important ways.”208 The BDA should be amended to allow universities to transfer the
patent rights to industry, not just invention managers. The university would not be required to be
on the patent infringement suit if they no longer have rights in the invention. Universities would
not have to worry about upsetting political ties if they were not involved in the lawsuits
concerning the FF inventions they developed.

This period of time would have to be researched. But I believe cutting a patent’s lifetime short
would be a great incentive to make sure it has commercial use and is not just a sitting time bomb
to be enforced some 15 years later after it was issued with no development in between issue and
enforcement.
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Courts “have routinely rejected academic exceptionalism,” in the past.209 Universities do
not have a special standard to follow when it comes to IP when acting as any other commercial
entity. Moreover, the Court’s implicit message in Griffith v. Kanamaru was that if universities
avail themselves to the benefits that the patent system offers, then they have to take all the
problems created too.210 If universities can enforce their patents the same as a PAE can, they
should not be given a higher right than other businesses.
Universities understand they are not entitled to special treatment. This has caused them to
improve their use of patents. They began
Enticing industry with more favorable licensing terms while reducing
encumbrances to their ownership of patents, launching new degree programs to
prove ‘the kind of education industry is seeking,’ and constructing and updating
building in which companies can set up research wings on campus are just a few
of the many ways in which universities are realigning their priorities in response
to a new financial reality.211
Treating universities special can only stifle commercialization of FF inventions. Forcing them to
act similar to industry will make them more efficient.
D. Patent Pools as a Limited Research Exemption
It is argued that universities should not patent experimental uses of a product. The
Experimental Use Doctrine (“EUD”) was first constructed in Whittemore v. Cutter, where Justice
Story said “it could never have been the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who
constructed such a machine merely for philosophical experiments.”212 However, the EUD did not
stand the test of time when Judge Rader obliterated it when he stated, “neither the statute nor any
past Supreme Court precedent gives any reason to excuse infringement because it was committed
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with a particular purpose or intent, such as for scientific experimentation or idle curiosity.”213
“[T]he Patent Act leaves no room for any de minimis or experimental use excuses for
infringement.”214
Patent pools have been proposed as a way to revive the EUD in a limited way.215 Patent
pools have been an approach for industry and government alike to get involved in disseminating
technology and creating products. However, their use may be counterproductive to the BDA.
Professor Pusinelli approached patent pools with the hopes of using it to revive the EUD
inside of the BDA. His first approach was for all researchers whose work is supported by federal
funds to have a limited, royalty-free license to make and use for research purposes all inventions
developed with federal funds.216 The proposed license does not include the right to sell.217 This
would give more access to FF research for those who need access in the short term.218 He
believes this will lead to the only inquiry being whether or not the government funds the
research. A fact he trivializes as easily ascertained, as this may not be the case.
Many universities and private companies work on more than one type of project at their
location. It is easily ascertained who has federal funding but the extent of the impact of the
funding on the entity is harder to discern.219 For instance, when a university has a research
exemption for technology there may be no oversight on what is acceptable use of the
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exemption.220 Professor Pusinelli has said it is hard to determine whether someone is using the
technology for research only or trying to design around it.221 Therefore, policing this exemption
would only lead to more litigation and uncertainty in FF inventions.
Professor Pusinelli recognizes another problem.222 In the case where the technology is
only used to research another (i.e. not sold as a good but instead a technique) there would be no
recovery to the patent holder. He suggests attaching a fee to the eventual sales from a product
produced by using the patented technique.223 This approach would require hiring extensive
amounts of people to determine which technologies the product affected. This would lead to FF
inventions becoming time bombs. Patent holders would sit back and wait until an invention was
made from a partner and then demand royalties while claiming their technology helped the
product. It would be near impossible to ascertain if they used the techniques or not. In the end, it
may give patent trolls an even bigger club to use against inventors.
In another approach, the patent pool would require the government to hold the patents for
all FF inventions. Then the royalties would get paid into the pool and distributed evenly
depending on the contribution of each participant.224 This would require accounting of each
patent’s contribution. Further, this approach would be similar to times prior to the BDA,
220
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effectively eliminating individual control of the patent rights. Universities would not be able to
transfer the invention from the patent pool and instead would be stuck with a straight royalty for
the invention. This may discourage industry, as rights in the FF inventions would be clouded
once more. Any costs in commercializing the invention would be harder to recoup, as recovery
would be limited to the extent that the entire pool achieves a return.
Moreover, the pooling agreements would not be allowed unless they “contribute to an
efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity among the participants.”225 Patent pools
can restrict the field when the access to the patent pool is limited and where members cannot
license out their individual IP.226 Professor Pusinelli notes the free use of the patented invention
in research may eventually result in a negative effect on incentives to develop the patented
invention, which would defeat the purpose of the BDA rendering it moot.227
The “consensus among those studying the American patent system is to focus on
utilitarian approaches.”228 The BDA is an extension of the patent system and the approach should
be similar when studying it. The BDA promotes dissemination of technology into the public
space with new products. However, creating patent pools would inevitably clog the system.
There would have to be another governmental agency to police the pools. Moreover, the pools
themselves would act as barriers to entering the field. Patent pools would not promote the goals
of the BDA.
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Patent pools would end up becoming governmentally funded patent trolls. They would
extort anyone wanting to enter the field into paying into or becoming a part of their patent pool.
Even with the BDA creating more products out of the FF inventions, not every FF invention can
be seen as commercial product that actually benefits society. Some inventions probably were
better kept on the shelf. Additionally, it would inevitably be unfair to the inventors in the patent
pools with inventions generating revenue to share the patents with the rest of the pool, if the
others do not generate any revenue. There would have to be some entity to provide an accounting
to the group of who used which patents. Overall, patent pools for FF inventions would be similar
to the welfare system for bad inventions. Patent pools could not have been an intention of the
BDA.
E. Relaxing the “Exceptional circumstances” and “March in Rights”
Another proposal to further the goals of the BDA is to allow the government more
discretion over which FF inventions inventors pursue patent rights on. Professors Rai and
Eisenburg have proposed a solution to liberalize the circumstances in which the government may
take the patent rights in an invention.229 They propose a solution of increasing the discretion
government agencies have when giving out federal funds. They propose to delete the
“exceptional circumstances” language from the BDA and remove the requirement that the
government hold March-In Rights in abeyance.230 The proposal would remove the administrative
checks and balances built into the BDA to protect patent owners against pre-BDA hostility
towards patents from government agencies. The proposal would effectively eviscerate the BDA,
not improve it.
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The proposed changes will bring FF research back to pre-1980.231 Professors Rai and
Eisenburg argue that the times have changed and government agencies will not restrict patenting
of FF research to pre-1980 levels, but they do note this is a possibility in the long-term.232
“While this provision would seem ideally suited to their purpose, [Rai and Eisenburg] note that
in fact it is an unwieldy tool.”233 Professors Rai and Eisenburg offer a modification to the BDA
that removes the structure the BDA has created.
To relax the BDA, as suggested, would require the government determining, in advance,
which inventions are worthy of patent protection. In other words, the government must predict
the future. Even though, there is dictum in Vitamin Technologists v. Wisconsin Alumni Research
Found. that suggests university “patents should not constrain access to an important discovery
with great potential to enhance social welfare,” predicting that potential is not easy.234 The use of
hindsight may not be enough to determine which inventions should have patent protection let
alone predicting the future. Sometimes, the potential of a FF invention cannot even be seen as
important until years in the future.235 A commercial entity must undertake a gamble when
developing a new product, with sales as unpredictable as the stock market. If you cannot
determine what the research will create, you cannot properly decide whether or not to restrict the
patent rights to the inventions.
The proposal would also require significant governmental involvement to monitor. The
proposal would require 1,000 new employees.236 Professors Rai and Eisenberg believe, since the
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NIH is drawn from scientists and universities’ employees, they are best suited to determine
which programs are deserving of patents in FF inventions.237 This may not be true, as AUTM
will argue TTOs are best suited to determine what to do with inventions and others argue that
inventors will be.238 Further, they put forth no reasoning why the NIH has employees that are
less prone to promote underuse of FF inventions now, than the pre-BDA era. In any event, the
amount of oversight required would frustrate industry as they tried to sort out what IP rights they
would have in the invention.
The relaxing of the BDA as proposed by Professors Rai, Eisenburg and Pusinelli would
de-incentivize developing FF inventions. Overall, their approaches to fix the BDA are misplaced.
Professors Rai and Eisenburg are arguing for “abolition of the BDA not a subtle tuning to
effectuate its purpose.”239 Additionally, neither Professor Pusinelli, nor Rai and Eisenburg’s
proposals extend to research tools created with private funds. These tools could be the ones that
are the most restrictive to the potential victim. The extension of “‘patentable material’ into the
realm of science . . . reflects developments in a much broader set of policies and institutions
(notably, in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office).”240 Specifically targeting their attack to the
BDA would not effectuate their purpose, as noble as it may be. Privately developed inventions
would still restrict research. Their approach would be better suited towards a 35 U.S.C. § 101
challenge.241
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Conclusion
When enhancing a law that has brought structure to an area with undefined rights you
should not look to dismantle that structure. Most proposals to change the BDA would undermine
its structure. It is hard to determine what incentives are needed to drive industry to develop
products without stifling further development. However, creating patent pools or limited research
exemptions would inevitably clog the system. Additionally, promoting academic exceptionalism
in the context of patents should not be allowed. If universities can enforce their patents the same
as a PAE they should not be given a higher right than other businesses. The goals of the BDA are
to turn FF inventions into commercially available products, not to create profits for the patentee.
Creating commercial products cannot mean asserting a patent with no intentions of
turning that patent into a product. When a patentee is enforcing a patent, as a PAE, they should
have to affirmatively prove that they have “within a reasonable time taken effective steps to
achieve practical application of the subject invention in such field of use.”242 Adding an
automatic right for the government to take title to the FF invention will further promote diligence
in creating products with those holding FF inventions, if the BDA is not complied with.
Furthermore, removing universities from lawsuits can let proper decisions be made that
will promote further commercialization instead of achieving a university goal. Increasing the
options a university-inventor has to use while commercializing their invention will increase the
benefit society receives from federal funding. Furthermore, allowing industry to be on equal
footing with TTOs and other PAEs can remove universities from the decision making process.
The BDA has had a great impact on FF inventions. Its provisions have not aged well with
time as universities have become increasing similar to commercial entities. Repealing the law
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may undo all the structure it has accomplished and throw FF inventions in a zone of uncertainty.
Ultimately, the provisions of the BDA need to be updated to reflect the current state of the
system.
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